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Abstract We consider the problem of designing residual generators with least dy-
namical orders to solve actuator fault detection and isolation problems for a Boeing
747-100/200 aircraft. The main result of our analysis is the proof of feasibility of
the complete isolation of all primary actuator/surface faults in the nominal case
by using a minimal number of additional surface angle sensors. The analysis of
the nominal case provides residual lter specications which can be employed in a
more realistic design, where robustness aspects with respect to external noise (gusts,
measurements) and parametric/ight condition uncertainties are also considered.
1 Introduction
In this chapter we address the problem of detection and isolation of actuator faults
for a Boeing 747-100/200 from the perspective of fault tolerant control (FTC). The
main goal of FTC is to allow, after a successful identication of faults, the applica-
tion of appropriate control reconguration to ensure safe operation of the aircraft in
the presence of identied failures or, in extreme cases, to guarantee a safe landing
to the nearest airport. The most relevant faults for our analysis are related to four
categories of primary control surfaces: elevator, stabilizer, rudder, and ailerons.
In numerous studies, the occurrence of actuator faults for the Boeing 747-
100/200 aircraft has been addressed in a simplistic way, by assuming that all faults
related to a surface category occur simultaneously [1, 2]. For example, it is usu-
ally assumed that all four elevators are simultaneously affected by the same fault
or, equivalently, each elevator fault is assimilated with a global fault on all elevator
surfaces. As a consequence, the typical approach to compensate for elevator faults is
to use the stabilizer for the aircraft altitude control and ignore the possibility of em-
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ploying, for the same purpose, the remaining healthy elevator surfaces. For the pur-
pose of FTC, such a simplifying assumption of simultaneous elevator faults prevents
exploiting the existing freedom in using healthy surfaces which could compensate
(fully or partially) the disturbance induced by the faulty surfaces.
This way of addressing the fault occurrence aspect is clearly not appropriate
for the purpose of FTC, where precise information on the available healthy actua-
tors/surfaces and faulty ones could be vital for an appropriate control recongura-
tion. The existing redundancy in the control surfaces makes it easier to cope with
partial failures providing an increased overall safety. Thus, handling only complete
surface failures is not a realistic option for FTC.
In this paper we focus on the design of residual generators with least dynami-
cal orders to solve actuator fault detection and isolation problems for the Boeing
747-100/200 aircraft. The main result of our analysis is the proof of feasibility of
the complete isolation of all primary actuator/surface faults in the nominal case
by using a minimal number of additional surface angle sensors. The analysis of
the nominal case provides residual lter specications which can be employed in a
more realistic design, where robustness aspects with respect to external noise (gusts,
measurements) and parametric/ight condition uncertainties are also considered.
The paper is organized as follows. First we briey review the solution of the
fault detection problem using scalar output detectors with least dynamical order.
The corresponding design procedure is based on the nullspace method in combina-
tion with dynamic cover techniques. This method is the basis for the design of a
bank of residual generators to solve the more involved fault detection and isolation
problems, where a given fault-to-residual inuence structure must be achieved. The
design methods of residual generators for fault detection and isolation have been re-
cently implemented as robust numerical software, which extends the Fault Detection
Toolbox [3] of DLR. The new tools were used to study the feasibility of complete
fault detection and isolation of actuator faults for a Boeing 747-100/200 aircraft.
Fault detection both at component (actuator) level as well as at the system level are
discussed. Residual synthesis results are presented for detecting and isolating both
longitudinal and lateral axis failures for several inuence structures of increasing
complexity. The main result of out study is the solution of the complete isolation
problem by employing a minimum number of additional surface sensors.
2 Design of Least Order Scalar Output Detectors
Consider the linear time-invariant system described by the input-output relations
y(s) = Gu(s)u(s)+Gd(s)d(s)+G f (s)f(s), (1)
where y(s), u(s), d(s), and f(s) are Laplace-transformed vectors of the p-dimen-
sional system output vector y(t), mu-dimensional control input vector u(t), m f -
dimensional fault signal vector f (t), and md-dimensional disturbance vector d(t),
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respectively, and where Gu(s), G f (s) and Gd(s) are the transfer-function matrices
(TFMs) from the control inputs to outputs, fault signals to outputs, and disturbances
to outputs, respectively.
To detect faults, residual generator lters (or fault detectors) having the general
form
r(s) = R(s)
[
y(s)
u(s)
]
(2)
are employed, where r(t) is the residual signal generated from the available mea-
surements y(t) and control inputs u(t). A residual generator must fulll two basic
requirements: 1) to generate zero residuals in the fault-free case, for arbitrary con-
trol and disturbance inputs; 2) to generate nonzero residuals when any fault occurs
in the system. These requirements can be made precise as follows:
Fault Detection Problem (FDP): Determine a proper and stable linear residual
generator having the general form (2) such that:
(i) r(t) = 0 when f (t) = 0 for all u(t) and d(t);
(ii) r(t) 6= 0 when fi(t) 6= 0, for i = 1, . . . ,m f .
In addition to the above requirements, it is often necessary for practical use that the
TFM of the detector R(s) has the least possible McMillan degree. Note that as a
fault detector, we can always choose R(s) as a rational row vector.
The fulllment of requirement (ii) ensures that faults produce non-zero residual
responses. When designing fault detectors this requirement for fault detectability
is usually replaced by the stronger request that persistent (constant) faults produce
asymptotically persistent (constant) residuals. This requirement is known as strong
fault detectability and has a special importance for practical applications [22].
Let G fi(λ ) be the i-th column of G f (λ ). A necessary and sufcient condition for
the existence of a solution of the FDP is the following [4, 5]:
Theorem 1. For the system (1) the FDP is solvable iff
rank [Gd(λ ) G fi(λ ) ] > rankGd(λ ), i = 1, . . . ,m f (3)
The requirements (i) and (ii) of the FDP can be easily transcribed into equivalent
algebraic conditions. Condition (i) is equivalent to
R(s)G(s) = 0 (4)
where
G(s) =
[
Gu(s) Gd(s)
Imu 0
]
, (5)
while the detectability condition (ii) is equivalent to
R fi(s) 6= 0, i = 1, . . . ,m f (6)
where R fi(s) is the i-th column of
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R f (s) := R(s)
[
G f (s)
0
]
(7)
Enforcing the strong detectability of constant faults is equivalent to ensuring nite
non-zero DC-gains for each column of R f (s), i.e.
0 <
∥∥R fi(0)∥∥ < ∞, i = 1, . . . ,m f (8)
Conditions (4) and (6) (or (8)) lead to a straightforward design procedure:
FD Least Order Synthesis Procedure
1. Compute a minimal basis Nl(s) for the left nullspace of G(s).
2. Choose a rational vector h(s) such that
R(s) = h(s)Nl(s)
has least McMillan degree and fullls (6) (or (8)).
3. If necessary, replace R(s) by m(s)R(s), where m(s) is chosen to achieve a
desired dynamics for the resulting detector.
The scalar output detector R(s) at Step 2) is determined as a linear combination
of the basis vectors (rows of Nl(s)), such that conditions (6) or (8) are fullled.
The above expression for R(s) represents a parametrization of all possible detectors
and is the basis for the class of nullspace methods introduced in [6]. While this work
relies on using polynomial nullspace bases for Nl(s), an alternative approach relying
on proper rational bases has been proposed by the author in [7]. The main advantage
of this latter method is to rely exclusively on reliable numerical techniques based on
state-space computations (see Section 4).
3 Solving Fault Isolation Problems
The more advanced functionality of fault isolation (i.e., obtaining the exact location
of faults) can be often achieved by designing a bank of fault detectors [8] or by
direct design of fault isolation lters [9]. Designing detectors which are sensitive
to some faults and insensitive to others can be reformulated as a standard FDP, by
formally redening the faults to be rejected in the residual as ctitious disturbances.
Let R(s) be a given detector and let R f (s) be the corresponding fault-to-residual
TFM in (7). We denote Rif j (s) as the (i, j) entry of R f (s). We dene the fault signa-
ture matrix S, with (i, j) entry Si j given by
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Si j = 1 if Rif j (0) 6= 0
Si j = −1 if Rif j (0) = 0 and R
i
f j(s) 6= 0
Si j = 0 if Rif j (s) = 0
If Si j = 1 then we say that the fault j is strongly detected in residual i. If Si j = −1
then the fault j is only weakly detected in residual i. The fault j is not detected in
residual i if Si j = 0.
The following fault detection and isolation problem (FDIP) can now be formu-
lated: Given a q×m f fault signature matrix S determine a bank of q stable and
proper scalar output residual generator lters
ri(s) = Ri(s)
[
y(s)
u(s)
]
, i = 1, . . . ,q (9)
such that, for all u(t) and d(t) we have:
(i) ri(t) = 0 when f j(t) = 0, ∀ j with Si j 6= 0;
(ii) ri(t) 6= 0 when f j(t) 6= 0, ∀ j with Si j 6= 0.
In this formulation of the FDIP, each scalar output detector Ri(s) achieves an
inuence structure representing the i-th row of the desired fault signature structure
matrix S. For example, to achieve the complete isolation of a maximum of k simul-
taneous faults, the choice S = Ik is necessary. In many practical applications this
strong isolation can not be achieved due to the lack of sufcient number of mea-
surements. If we can assume that the faults occur one at a time, a so-called weak
isolation of k faults could be possible by using a fault signature matrix whose i-th
row contains all ones except the element in column i which is zero. For example,
for 3 faults S is chosen as
S =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

If this fault signature specication can be achieved, then the occurrence of fault i can
be detected if all residuals (excepting the i-th residual) are non-zero. More insight
into how to specify fault signature matrices can be found in [10].
Let S be a given q×m f fault signature matrix and denote by G
i
f (s) the matrix
formed from the columns of G f (s) whose column indices j correspond to zero el-
ements in row i of S. The solvability conditions of the FDIP build up from the
solvability of q individual FDPs.
Theorem 2. For the system (1) the FDIP with given fault signature matrix S is solv-
able if and only if for each i = 1, . . . ,q, we have
rank [Gd(s) G
i
f (s) G f j (s) ] > rank [Gd(s) G
i
f (s) ] (10)
for all j such that Si j 6= 0.
The standard approach to determine R(s) is to design for each row i of the fault
signature matrix S, a detector Ri(s) which generates the i-th residual signal ri(t),
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and thus represents the i-th row of R(s). For this purpose, the nullspace method can
be applied with G(s) in (5) replaced by
G(s) =
[
Gu(s) Gd(s) G
i
f (s)
Imu 0 0
]
and with a redened fault to output TFM G˜if (s), formed from the columns of G f (s)
whose indices j correspond to Si j 6= 0.
The resulting global detector can be assembled as
R(s) =
 R
1(s)
.
.
.
Rq(s)
 (11)
and has a total McMillan degree which is bounded by the sum of the McMillan
degrees of the component detectors. Note that this upper bound can be effectively
achieved, for example, by choosing mutually different poles for the individual de-
tectors.
Using the least order design techniques described in this paper, for each row of
S we can design a scalar output detector of least McMillan degree. However, even
if each detector has the least possible order, there is generally no guarantee that the
resulting order of R(s) is also the least possible one. To the best of our knowledge,
the determination of a detector of least global McMillan degree for a given fault
signature S is still an open problem. A solution to this problem has been recently
suggested in [11] and is summarized in the following synthesis procedure:
FDI Synthesis Procedure
1. For i = 1, ...,q
a. Redene disturbance vector d to include all faults f j for which Si j = 0.
b. Redene fault vector f by deleting all faults f j for which Si j = 0.
c. Compute Ri(s) of order νi using the FD Least Order Synthesis Proce-
dure.
2. Ensure that for νi ≤ ν j , the poles of Ri(s) are among the poles of R j(s).
3. Form the global detector R(s) according to (11).
It was conjectured in [11] that the McMillan degree of R(s) resulting from this
procedure is the least possible one.
We describe now an enhanced two step approach to design a bank of detectors,
which for larger values of q, is potentially more efcient than the above standard
approach. In a rst step, we can reduce the complexity of the original problem by
decoupling the inuences of disturbances and control inputs on the residuals. In a
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second stage, a residual generation lter is determined for a system without control
and disturbance inputs which achieves the desired fault signature.
Let Nl(s) be a minimal left nullspace basis for G(s) dened in (5) and dene a
new system without control and disturbance inputs as
y˜(s) := N f (s)f(s), (12)
where
N f (s) := Nl(s)
[
G f (s)
0
]
. (13)
The system (12) has generally a reduced McMillan degree [12] and also a reduced
number of outputs p− rd, where rd is the normal rank of Gd(s).
For the reduced system (12) with TFM N f (s) we can determine, using the FDI
Synthesis Procedure, a bank of q scalar output least order detectors of the form
ri(s) = R˜i(s)y˜(s), i = 1, . . . ,q (14)
such that the same conditions are fullled as for the original FDIP. The TFM of the
nal detector can be assembled as
R(s) =
 R˜
1(s)
.
.
.
R˜q(s)
Nl(s) (15)
Comparing (15) and (11) we have
Ri(s) = R˜i(s)Nl(s), (16)
which can be also interpreted as an updating formula of a preliminary (incomplete)
design. The resulting order of the i-th detector is the same as before, but this two
step approach has the advantage that the nullspace computation and the associated
least order design involve systems of reduced orders (in the sizes of state, input and
output vectors).
The above procedure has been used for the example studied in [13, Table 2],
where a 18× 9 fault signature matrix S served as specication. Each line of S can
be realized by a detector of order 1 or 2 with eigenvalues {−1} or {−1,−2}. The
sum of the orders of the resulting individual detectors is 32, but the resulting global
detector R(s) has McMillan degree 6. Interestingly, the least order detector com-
puted in [13] has order 14.
4 Computational Aspects
For the numerical computations, state space representation based algorithms have
been developed to serve as a basis for robust software implementations. For this
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purpose, a state space realization of (1) is employed
x(t)=Ax(t)+Buu(t)+Bdd(t)+B f f (t)
y(t)=Cx(t)+Duu(t)+Ddd(t)+D f f (t) (17)
with the n-dimensional state vector x(t). The corresponding TFMs of the model in
(1) are
Gu(s) = C(sI−A)−1Bu +Du
Gd(s) = C(sI−A)−1Bd +Dd
G f (s) = C(sI−A)−1B f +D f
The FD Synthesis Procedure to design scalar output residual generators with
least dynamical orders can be performed using the numerically sound computational
approach proposed recently in [11]. This approach represents an enhancement of the
minimal dynamic covers techniques introduced in [7], by employing Type I dynamic
covers (instead of Type II covers) to achieve the maximal order reduction of the re-
sulting detector. A basic computational ingredient to perform Step 1 is a reliable
numerical algorithm to compute least order rational nullspaces of rational matrices
using state-space methods [7]. The main computation in this algorithm is the or-
thogonal reduction of the system pencil matrix of the realization of G(s) in (5) to a
Kronecker-like form, from which, practically without any additional computation, a
least order rational nullspace basis can be obtained. The existence conditions of the
solution (6) can be easily checked using the outcome of the nullspace computation
algorithm [11]. The least order fault detector at Step 2 can be obtained by selecting
an appropriate linear combination of the basis vectors by eliminating non-essential
dynamics using Type I dynamic covers based order reduction [11, 14]. To perform
Step 3, stable coprime factorization techniques can be used for which reliable nu-
merical algorithms based on pole assignment techniques are available [15].
The efcient implementation of the enhanced FDI Synthesis Procedure requires
an explicit updating of a preliminary design (16). State space realization based com-
putations of N f (s) in (13) as well as of the resulting least order detectors Ri(s) in
(16) are described in [12]. Remarkably, the matrices of the underlying state space
realizations of N f (s) can be obtained using exclusively orthogonal transformations
on the system matrices of the original state space realization (17). By using these
updating techniques, any need to determine minimal realizations (e.g., in (13)) has
been practically eliminated.
For all underlying numerical computations, robust numerical software is avail-
able in the DESCRIPTOR SYSTEMS Toolbox [16]. This software underlies the imple-
mentation of a rst version of a the FAULT DETECTION Toolbox [3], where several
tools are available to solve the main classes of fault detection problems. The recently
developed enhancements have been implemented in a new function fdsyn which
is fully documented in [17].
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5 Monitoring Actuator Failures
The monitoring of primary actuator failures of an aircraft is of paramount impor-
tance for the safe operation and for the continuous situation awareness of the pilots.
In this section we address the fault detection and isolation of all FTC relevant actu-
ator failures by combining component level and system level fault monitoring tech-
niques. The main goal of our analysis is to prove the feasibility of a complete fault
diagnosis system capable of localizing individual or simultaneous actuator/surface
faults.
For our study we consider the Boeing 747-100/200 aircraft for which a high
delity nonlinear simulation model with a full set of control surfaces is available.
This model with 11 primary control surface actuators (4 elevators, 1 stabilizer, 4
ailerons, 2 rudders) has been set up within the GARTER AG16 as a benchmark for
FTC studies. The original model [18] with only pilot inputs has been used in several
fault detection studies [2], with focus on various aspects mentioned in Section 1.
For the Boeing 747-100/200 aircraft several fault scenarios are of particular in-
terest. For example, the ability to detect single primary actuator faults is of critical
importance, since it can be seen as part of the aircraft specication according to the
requirements of FAA/FAR and EASA/CS. Thus a minimum request from the FTC
perspective is the requirement that for modern aircraft design, no single failure leads
to a catastrophic consequence.
Simultaneous faults can also occur, especially when multiple surface damages
occur. The detection and isolation of simultaneous faults requires a more involved
residual generation system and also the availability of a sufciently large number
of measurements. Although surface angle sensors can be installed on each control
surface, an interesting aspect is to determine the minimum number of sensors nec-
essary to completely solve the fault isolation problem. We give an answer to this
problem by combining component level and system level fault monitoring.
The main goal of our study of detectability and isolability of actuator/surface
faults was to demonstrate the feasibility of FDI for a complete set of faults. The full
isolation requires placing a minimum number of additional surface angle sensors.
An interesting result of our study also reveals the best achievable isolation capabili-
ties in the absence of additional sensors.
Only the nominal case is studied corresponding to a normal cruise ight. The re-
sults obtained, consisting of several residual generators and the corresponding fault-
to-residual lter specications, can serve as meaningful specications for a more
realistic design where input/output noise and uncertainties in the model parameters
and ight conditions are also addressed. Finding the minimal number of additional
sensors allowing the isolation of all surface faults is one of the main achievements
of this study.
In what follows, we show rst the capabilities of component level monitoring,
which is traditionally used on present day aircraft. The intrinsic limitations of this
approach, for example, to detect surface failures leading to loss of effectiveness, re-
quire addressing the FDIP using system level monitoring. However, the system level
approach has its own limitations due to the restricted number of available measure-
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ments, therefore full FDI is not possible unless additional surface sensors are used.
As can be easily guessed, the nal solution of the FDIP is a combination of both
approaches by employing a minimal number of sensors.
5.1 Component Level Monitoring
Typically actuators are modelled as rst order linear systems which together with
the corresponding control surfaces have transfer functions of the form
gu(s) =
K
s+K
(18)
Here the value of K is determined taking into account the physical rate limits of
the respective surface, and represents an average value applicable to all ight con-
ditions. Typical choices for the Boeing actuators are: 37/(s+37) for the elevators,
0.5/(s + 0.5) for the stabilizer, 50/(s + 50) for the ruders and ailerons. The task
of the fault detection at the actuator level is to identify typical actuator faults like
‘stuck actuator’ (also called lock-in place failure), ‘actuator runaway’ (also called
hard-over failure), ‘free-play’ (also called oat-type failure), or loss of actuator ef-
fectiveness. In what follows we discuss some aspects of fault detection and isolation
for a generic actuator.
Consider the actuator model (18) for which we would like to design a fault detec-
tor able to identify the fault types mentioned previously. For this purpose, a simple
detector which estimates the deviation of surface position on the basis of measured
control surface position and commanded control surface position is given by the
simple observer-like structure
R(s) =
[
1 −gu(s)
]
Note that the dynamics of lter can be arbitrarily assigned by replacing R(s) with
m(s)R(s), where m(s) is an arbitrary stable transfer function.
With such a detector, an actuator fault can be easily detected by checking the
condition r(t) 6= 0. The stationary value of the residual signal r(∞) can also be used
to estimate the actual DC-gain of the actuator, say g0, and thus the actuator effec-
tiveness. Since g0 = 1− r(∞), in the fault-free case we have g0 = 1. DC-gain values
in the range [0, 1 ] indicate a loss of actuator effectiveness with a zero gain indicat-
ing ‘free-play’. Values outside this domain indicates either a ‘stuck actuator’ in a
certain position or even an ‘actuator runaway’ (i.e., stuck in an extreme position).
The main weakness of this simple fault detection scheme is that it does not
work properly in the case of surface position sensor failures. This lack of reliability
against combined actuator and sensor failures could be a source of false alarms. An-
other potential problem is when the actuator is fault free but the corresponding con-
trol surface is damaged. The associated loss of effectiveness of the actuation/control
surface system can not be detected in this way.
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A typical approach to overcome the rst weakness is to add hardware redun-
dancy by increasing the number of sensors to a level which ensures a satisfactory
reliability of measurements. A standard approach is to use three sensors in a voting
logic for validity checking. This is the minimum hardware redundancy to guarantee
the reliability of monitoring. Interestingly, using model based fault detection tech-
niques, it is possible to obtain practically the same level of condence by using only
two sensors (the model based approach provides a third ‘virtual’ sensor).
The actuator system with two identical sensors is described by the transfer-
function matrix
Gu(s) =
[
1
1
]
gu(s)
The fault TFM corresponding to the actuator fault f1 and two sensor faults f2 and
f3 is
G f (s) = [Gu(s) I2 ]
A possible least order detector for this setup can be chosen as
R(s) =
 1 −1 00 1 −gu(s)
1 0 −gu(s)

and can be realized as a rst order system. The resulting fault detection system
achieves the following fault signature
S =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

Assuming that the actuator fault and sensor faults occur one at a time, this inu-
ence structure provides a complete isolation of a single fault by using the following
isolation logic:
 actuator fault occurred if r1 = 0, r2 6= 0, and r3 6= 0;
 rst sensor failed if r1 6= 0, r2 = 0, and r3 6= 0;
 second sensor failed if r1 6= 0, r2 6= 0, and r3 = 0.
In this way, the occurrence of each fault can be reliably detected. For fault identi-
cation, the information provided by either residual signal r1 or r2 can be employed.
To address the second aspect of loss of control surface effectiveness a system
level analysis could be appropriate (see next section).
For component level diagnosis more detailed actuator models can be used, by
explicitly modelling the dynamics of all actuator components. Such an approach
based on physical parametric models is also suitable for health monitoring purposes.
Another application of potential interest is to detect the so-called ‘oscillatory
failure’ (e.g., of a rudder) as a result of limit cycle oscillations. This type of failure
can trigger an aeroelastic resonance behavior of the aircraft with unacceptably high
loads. To identify this type of faults, the detection scheme above can be supple-
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mented with an additional signal analysis based oscillation detection system (e.g.,
sub-band ltering followed by Fourier analysis).
5.2 System Level Monitoring
The monitoring of actuator faults at the system level is primarily intended to in-
crease overall aircraft safety by detecting fault categories which can not be handled
by the usual component level monitoring. Such faults are, for example, the loss of
efciency of control surfaces due to possible structural damage or as a result of
icing.
The study of the nominal case has as its main purpose getting a clear understand-
ing of the intrinsic limitations in solving the FDIP in an idealized situation. Further-
more, the achieved fault-to-residual specications can serve as reference models for
a model-matching formulation of the FDIP [19], where system variabilities (para-
metric, ight conditions) are fully considered.
Actuator fault diagnosis for the whole aircraft can be done in several ways. An
approach advocated by several authors is to use so-called multi-models describing
the aircraft in normal ight conditions as well as in several faulty situations. A bank
of model detection lters can be designed to ensure a desired model-to-residual
signature allowing the application of simple decision logic to identify the current
model (normal or faulty). The main advantage of this approach is its simplicity, both
because of a simple design of the detectors as well as because of the simple residual
evaluation scheme. The main disadvantage is the need for a large number of models
(and thus detectors) to cover many faults and combinations of faults. Moreover,
different levels of actuator efciency loss are usually represented as separate models,
thus making the number of necessary detectors increase exponentially.
The approach we follow in our study is to model actuator faults as additive dis-
turbances. The linearized fault model of the aircraft corresponding to a given set of
parameter values and a specic ight condition (e.g., straight-and-level ight) has
the standard input-output form (1) and the detector is designed in the lter form (2).
The linearized models which have been employed were determined using the nomi-
nal values of the parameters in Table 5.2. In what follows we summarize the results
of designing fault detectors for the nominal case.
The longitudinal and full order linearized state space models of the aircraft are
given in Appendices A and B. These models correspond to the following parameter
values: mass = 317,000 kg, center of gravity coordinates: Xcg = 25%, Ycg = 0, Zcg =
0. The chosen ight condition is a straight-and-level ight at altitude 600 m, with
a speed of 92.6 m/s, with a ap setting at 20o and with landing gear up. For more
details on the employed model see [18].
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Table 1 Definition of variables and trim condition
Variable Nominal Value Range
Altitude 600 m (2000 ft) [ 0, 1000 ]
Air speed 92.6 m/s [ 85, 135 ]
Landing gear up
Mass[kg] 317,000 [ 263,000, 320,000 ]
Xcg 25% [ 22%, 28% ]
Ycg[m] 0 [ -1, 1 ]
Zcg[m] 0 [ -1, 1 ]
Flight path angle (γ) 0o
Flap setting 20o
5.3 Pitch Axis Fault Monitoring
To detect elevator and/or stabilizer faults, we use the longitudinal aircraft model in
state-space form (17), where the matrices A, Bu, C, and Du are dened in Appendix
A. The elevator and stabilizer fault inputs are dened as
f =

f1
f2
f3
f4
f5


right inner elevator f ault [rad]
le f t inner elevator f ault [rad]
right outer elevator f ault [rad]
le f t outer elevator f ault [rad]
stabilizer f ault [rad]

and thus B f = Bu(:,1 : 5) and D f = Du(:,1 : 5). For this study of the nominal case
we consider no disturbance inputs for the model.
The achievable fault signature is
S =

1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
−1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 −1

From the last three lines of S it can be observed that the isolation of faults grouped
in three groups ( f1, f2), ( f3, f4) and f5 is achievable, although all groups are only
weakly detectable.
System level monitoring can be used as a complementary tool to device level
monitoring in the case when sensor fault monitoring is not additionally provided.
The simplest fault detection task is to determine if any actuator fault in the pitch
axis has occurred. This comes down to the design of a fault detector achieving the
trivial signature corresponding to the rst row of S
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S0 =
[
1 1 1 1 1
]
by using the lowest order dynamics. To design such a detector, the function fdsyn
has been used. Using the least order design option, a rst order residual generator
can be determined. The resulting fault-to-residual dynamics are
R f (s) =
[
10
s+10
10
s+10
10.43
s+10
10.43
s+10
−5.188s+58.45
s+10
]
If we would like to isolate elevator and stabilizer faults, only the following choice
of the signature matrix is achievable
S1 =
[
1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 −1
]
with the second row having only a weak detectability structure. If we assume that
elevator and stabilizer faults can not simultaneously occur, we can achieve elevator
and stabilizer fault isolation by using the specication matrix
S2 =
[
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
]
To isolate ( f1, f2, f3, f4) and f5 the following decision logic can be used:
 elevator fault occurred if r2 6= 0;
 stabilizer fault occurred if r1 6= 0 and r2 = 0.
A residual generator achieving the above specication can be obtained as a bank of
two detectors using the function fdsyn. Using the least order design option, two
rst order detectors can be determined, leading to a residual generator of total order
2.
Provided we can assume that the groups of faults ( f1, f2), ( f3, f4) and f5 do not
simultaneously occur, the achievable specication
S3 =
 0 0 1 1 11 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0

can be used for weak isolation using the following decision logic:
 inner elevator fault occurred if r1 = 0, r2 6= 0, and r3 6= 0;
 outer elevator fault occurred if r1 6= 0, r2 = 0, and r3 6= 0;
 stabilizer fault occurred if r1 6= 0, r2 6= 0, and r3 = 0.
Using the least order design option, three rst order detectors can be obtained
using the function fdsyn leading to a detector of total order 3. Note that without
the least order design option, a detector of total order 10 results, while using the
standard observer based approach (see for example [20]), a detector of total order
15 is to be expected. The resulting fault-to-residual dynamics are
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R f (s) =

0 0 10
s+10
10
s+10
862.7s−1889
s+10
10
s+10
10
s+10 0 0
−835.1s+2028
s+10
10
s+10
10
s+10
10.74
s+10
10.74
s+10 0

The step responses associated with the faults are presented in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 Step responses from the faults: f1 = 1, ..., f4 = 1, f5 = 0.01.
A more realistic setting is to add actuator dynamics to each input actuator-surface
channel [2]. As already mentioned, the elevator dynamics can be approximated by
transfer functions of the form 37/(s+37), while for the stabilizer dynamics we take
0.5/(s+0.5) as suggested in [2]. The resulting model has now order 10 and we can
achieve the same fault signature with a bank of three detectors of total order 6. The
step responses from the faults are presented in Fig. 2.
Further enhancement of fault isolation is possible by employing direct measure-
ments of surface positions. For example, with a single additional measurement of
the stabilizer surface angle it is possible to achieve the signature specication
S4 =
 1 1 0 0 00 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

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Fig. 2 Step responses from the faults (included actuator dynamics): f1 = 1, ..., f4 = 1, f5 = 0.01.
and thus to isolate the inner elevator, the outer elevator and the stabilizer faults. The
above specication can be achieved using a bank of three detectors of total order 5.
The step responses from the faults are presented in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3 Step responses from the faults with stabilizer angle measurement.
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Finally, for complete fault isolation it is to be expected that measurements from
all surfaces are necessary. Solving the fault detection and isolation problem corre-
sponds to achieve the specication S5 = I5 using the function fdsyn or employing
directly the specially devised function fdi, available in the FAULT DETECTION
toolbox [3]. This latter function is based on the method proposed in [9]. Using this
function, we obtain a detector of order 5 which solves the complete fault detection
and isolation problem. Interestingly, this detector is the same as that one obtained by
using single surface monitoring schemes. This remarkable result also illustrates the
real strengths of the recently developed minimal degree design techniques [9]. In
contrast, the methods traditionally used (e.g., using a bank of 5 observer based de-
tectors [20]) could lead to detectors of total order up to 70 in the case when actuator
dynamics are included.
Interestingly, complete isolation can also be achieved by choosing a minimal
number of three surface measurements: two from the left elevators and one from the
stabilizer. The resulting bank of ve detectors has a total order of 7 and the resulting
fault-to-residual TFM is
R f (s) = diag
(
10
s+10 ,
370
s2 +47s+370,
10
s+10 ,
370
s2 +47s+370,
10
s+10
)
The step responses from the faults are presented in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4 Step responses from the faults with left elevators and stabilizer angles measurements.
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5.4 Gear and Roll Axes Fault Monitoring
To detect rudder and/or aileron faults, we consider the full order (n = 10) aircraft
model in state-space form (17). The denition of state, input and output variables
and the corresponding state space matrices are given in Appendix B. The aileron
and rudder fault inputs are dened as
f =

f1
f2
f3
f4
f5
f6


right inner aileron f ault [rad]
le f t inner aileron f ault [rad]
right outer aileron f ault [rad]
le f t outer aileron f ault [rad]
upper rudder f ault [rad]
lower rudder f ault [rad]

and thus B f and D f are formed from the columns {1,2,3,4,10,11} of Bu and Du,
respectively.
For the two inner aileron faults { f1, f2}, two outer aileron faults { f3, f4}, and two
rudder faults { f5, f6}, the FDIP with the fault signature
S1 =
 1 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1

is achievable using a bank of three detectors with global order 3. The resulting fault-
to-residual TFM is
R f (s) =

10
s+10
10
s+10 0 0 0 0
0 0 10
s+10
10
s+10 0 0
0 0 0 0 11.85
s+10
10
s+10

The step responses from the faults are presented in Fig. 5.
We include now the actuator models and add three surface angle sensors for the
two right ailerons and for the upper ruder. With this sensor location the complete
FDIP with S2 = I6 can be solved to isolate all aileron and rudder failures. The re-
sulting detector has order 9 and the achieved fault-to-residual TFM is
R f (s) = diag
(
10
s+10 ,
100
s2 +20s+100,
10
s+10 ,
100
s2 +20s+100,
10
s+10 ,
−0.0002566s+100
s2 +20s+100
)
The step responses from the faults are presented in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 5 Step responses from the aileron and rudder faults.
−1
0
1
From: f1
To
: r
1
−1
0
1
To
: r
2
−1
0
1
To
: r
3
−1
0
1
To
: r
4
−1
0
1
To
: r
5
0 0.5 1
−1
0
1
To
: r
6
From: f2
0 0.5 1
From: f3
0 0.5 1
From: f4
0 0.5 1
From: f5
0 0.5 1
From: f6
0 0.5 1
 Step responses for complete FDI specification
 Time (sec)
 
R
es
id
ua
ls
Fig. 6 Step responses from the aileron and rudder faults.
20 Andras Varga
6 Summary of Achieved Results and Needs for Further Analysis
The nominal design of residual generators which has been undertaken provides valu-
able insight into the nature of the FDIP for aircraft actuator failures, demonstrates
the feasibility of complete fault isolation, and provides lter specications which
can be useful in a more realistic design of robust residual generators. The analysis
which has been performed of the FDIP for a complete set of primary ight surfaces
shows that a combination of component level monitoring with a system level mon-
itoring, allows the solution of this problem for a set of 11 actuator/surface failures.
Our study demonstrated the interesting fact that by appropriately locating a mini-
mal number of 6 surface angle sensors, complete isolation of faults is possible. The
resulting orders of the residual generators are surprisingly low: order 7 for pitch
axis monitoring and 9 for gear/roll axis monitoring. These gures lower to 3 and 3,
respectively, if no actuator models are included in the design.
By using the proposed least order detector design techniques implemented in re-
liable numerical software, a seamless switching among a large number of different
sensor congurations was possible using a single global model of larger order. Inter-
estingly, the reliability of the numerical algorithms which were employed allowed
us, to recover the same simple results in the case when sensors are used for all sur-
faces, as those obtained working with each actuator/surface component individually.
For the complete solution of the FDIP, the following aspects still need careful
consideration:
1. Surface angle sensor faults. To achieve complete reliability of the fault moni-
toring system, it is important to also consider possible faults in the surface angle
sensors. For example, by adding sensors to all surfaces, the complete isolation
of all actuator faults is possible, while additionally the isolation of a sensor fault
(e.g., stabilizer angle sensor) can be achieved. With three sensors (e.g., two for
left elevators and one for stabilizer), to achieve the isolation of one sensor fault,
we have to assume that sensor and actuator faults do not occur simultaneously.
A complete analysis of sensor location and assignment aspects is important for
practical applications (see also Part II of [21] for a recent survey).
2. Robustness against noisy inputs and noisy measurements. The effect of noisy
inputs and noisy measurements must be considered in a realistic design. Typical
noisy inputs for aircraft are gust turbulences, which can be taken into account
by feeding white noise into the system via stable and minimum-phase Dryden
spectra lters. Colouring lters driven by white noise can be used to model noise
in sensor measurements. For further details see [2] and the literature cited therein.
3. Robustness against parametric uncertainties. The robustness of the designed
detectors against parametric uncertainties is important for practical applicability.
Typical uncertain parameters to be considered for robustness studies are mass, the
coordinates of the center of gravity, as well as ight conditions (speed, altitude).
There are many possibilities to enforce the robustness of the designed detectors
[22] and this challenging aspect will be considered in further studies. The results
provided in this work can be seen as realistic specications of what can be aimed
to be achieved in the most favorable situation.
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Appendix A Linearized longitudinal model
Denition of variables
For the trim conditions dened for the nominal values in Table 5.2, the correspond-
ing linearized nominal longitudinal state space model of the Boeing 747 has the
form
x(t) = Ax(t)+Buu(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)+Duu(t)
where the state, input and output variables are dened as follows:
x =

δq
δVTAS
δα
δθ
δhe
 =:

pitch rate [rad/s]
true airspeed [m/s]
angle o f attack [rad]
pitch angle [rad]
altitude [m]

u =

δeir
δeil
δeor
δeol
δih
δEPR1
δEPR2
δEPR3
δEPR4

=:

right inner elevator [rad]
le f t inner elevator [rad]
right outer elevator [rad]
le f t outer elevator [rad]
stabilizer trim angle [rad]
thrust engine #1 [rad]
thrust engine #2 [rad]
thrust engine #3 [rad]
thrust engine #4 [rad]

y =

δα
δ VTAS
δθ
δq
δVz
δhe
 =:

angle o f attack [rad]
acceleration [m/s2]
pitch angle [rad]
pitch rate [rad/s]
vertical velocity [m/s]
altitude [m]

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State-model matrices
A =

−0.4861 0.000317 −0.5588 0 −2.04 ·10−6
0 −0.0199 3.0796 −9.8048 8.98 ·10−5
1.0053 −0.0021 −0.5211 0 9.30 ·10−6
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 −92.6 92.6 0

Bu =

−0.1455 −0.1455 −0.1494 −0.1494 −1.2860
0 0 0 0 −0.3122
−0.0071 −0.0071 −0.0074 −0.0074 −0.0676
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0.0013 0.0035 0.0035 0.0013
0.1999 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999
−0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0004
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

C =

0 0 1 0 0
0 −0.0199 3.0796 −9.8048 8.98 ·10−5
0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 −92.6 92.6 0
0 0 0 0 1

Du =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −0.3122 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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Appendix B Linearized full order model
Denition of variables
The trim conditions are dened for the nominal values specied in Table 5.2. The
state, control and output variables are dened as follows:
x =

δ p
δq
δ r
δVTAS
δα
δβ
δφ
δθ
δψ
δhe

=:

roll rate [rad/s]
pitch rate [rad/s]
yaw rate [rad/s]
true airspeed [m/s]
angle o f attack [rad]
sideslip angle [rad]
roll angle [rad]
pitch angle [rad]
yaw angle [rad]
altitude [m]

u =

δair
δail
δaor
δaol
δeir
δeil
δeor
δeol
δih
δru
δrl
δEPR1
δEPR2
δEPR3
δEPR4

=:

right inner aileron [rad]
le f t inner aileron [rad]
right outer aileron [rad]
le f t outer aileron [rad]
right inner elevator [rad]
le f t inner elevator [rad]
right outer elevator [rad]
le f t outer elevator [rad]
stabilizer trim angle [rad]
upper rudder sur f ace [rad]
lower rudder sur f ace [rad]
thrust engine #1 [rad]
thrust engine #2 [rad]
thrust engine #3 [rad]
thrust engine #4 [rad]

y =

δα
δ VTAS
δθ
δq
δVz
δhe
δ p
δ r
δβ
δVy
δφ

=:

angle o f attack [rad]
acceleration [m/s2]
pitch angle [rad]
pitch rate [rad/s]
z− velocity [m/s]
altitude [m]
roll rate [rad/s]
yaw rate [rad/s]
sideslip angle [rad]
y− velocity [m/s]
roll angle [rad]

Fault Detection and Isolation of Actuator Failures 25
State-model matrices
A =

−.8226 0 0.1666 0 0 −1.4189 0.000471
0 −0.4861 0 0.000317 −0.5588 0 0
−.1303 0 −0.0199 0 0 0.2387 −0.00166
0 0 0 −0.0199 3.0796 0 0
0 1.0053 0 −0.0021 −0.5211 0 0
0.139 0 −0.9867 0 0 −0.0819 0.10505
1 0 0.1265 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1.008 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −92.6 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 −2.04 ·10−6
0 0 0
−9.8048 0 8.98 ·10−5
0 0 9.30 ·10−6
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
92.6 0 0

C =

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −0.0199 3.0796 0 0 −9.8048 0 8.98 ·10−5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −92.6 0 0 92.6 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 92.6 −11.6213 0 92.6 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

26 Andras Varga
Bu =

−0.0629 0.0629 −0.1819 0.1819 0 0 0
0.0107 0.0107 −0.0676 −0.0676 −0.1455 −0.1455 −0.1494
−0.0142 0.0142 −0.0128 0.0128 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −0.0098 −0.0098 −0.0071 −0.0071 −0.0074
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.0652 0.0185 0.0034 0.0019 −0.0019 −0.0034
−0.1494 −1.2860 0 0 0.0013 0.0035 0.0035 0.0013
0 0 −0.1272 −0.0929 0.0195 0.0111 −0.0111 −0.0195
0 −0.3122 0 0 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999
−0.0074 −0.0676 0 0 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0004
0 0 0.0078 0.0066 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Du =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.3122 0 0 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Index
fault detectability, 3
strong, 3
fault detection, 1
computational methods, 8
nullspace method, 4
residual generator, 3
fault detection and isolation problem, 5
strong isolation, 5
weak isolation, 5
fault detection problem, 3
fault monitoring, 9
component level, 10
system level, 12
fault signature matrix, 4
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